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Abstract
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to
be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches.
A matching is stable if there are no blocking pairs, i.e., no pair of agents that prefer each other
to their assigned matches. In this paper we study a variant of stable matching motivated by the
fact that, in most centralized markets, many agents do not have direct communication with each
other. Hence even if some blocking pairs exist, the agents involved in those pairs may not be able
to coordinate a deviation. We model communication channels with a bipartite graph between
the two sets of agents which we call the social graph, and we study socially stable matchings. A
matching is socially stable if there are no blocking pairs that are connected by an edge in the
social graph. Socially stable matchings vary in size and so we look for a maximum socially stable
matching. We prove that this problem is NP-hard and, assuming the unique games conjecture,
hard to approximate within a factor of 3
2
− ǫ, for any constant ǫ. We complement the hardness
results with a 3
2
-approximation algorithm.
1 Introduction
The main functionality of many markets is to match agents to one another. A labor market matches
workers to firms; a marriage market matches men to women; an education market matches students
to schools; an online marketplace matches buyers to sellers, and so on. In these markets, agents have
preferences over potential matches based on the characteristics of the match – the experience and
skill of a worker, the salary and location of a firm, the personality and physique of a potential spouse,
the test scores of a student, etc. Standard economic theory suggests that the equilibria matchings
in such markets will exhibit a particular stability property. Stable matchings, and those that will
be produced as the outcome of matching markets, are matchings in which no pair of unmatched
agents block the matching, i.e., prefer each other to their assigned spouse. Intuitively, the rationale
behind this prediction is that if two unmatched agents form a blocking pair, then they will deviate
from the matching and thereby destroy it. The seminal results of Gale and Shapley [6] prove that
stable matchings always exist and can be computed efficiently by a centralized algorithm. Later
work of Roth [13], [14] showed that, remarkably, some centralized matching markets (most notably
the labor market for medical interns organized by the National Residency Matching Program)
do indeed employ algorithms similar to the one proposed by Gale and Shapley. Furthermore,
centralized markets that do not output stable matchings are statistically less likely to persist than
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their counterparts that do. Various theoretical studies [15], [2], [1] suggest that decentralized
markets may converge to stable outcomes as well.
However, in many markets, the existence of certain blocking pairs seems implausible. In par-
ticular, for a pair of agents to successfully block a matching, they must be aware of each other’s
existence, able to communicate the potential deviation, and able to enact it. Each of these as-
sumptions places fairly strong restrictions on the markets. For example, in sports drafts, matchings
of players to teams is typically implemented by a centralized unstable mechanism known as serial
dictatorship. Yet deviations are rarely observed as strong regulations prevent blocking pairs from
enacting the deviations. Sorority rush at certain colleges also employs a centralized unstable mech-
anism. Although some theory [12] suggests that agents manipulate the mechanism into producing
stable matches by reporting altered preferences, another explanation for the success of these mech-
anisms is that potential blocking pairs have difficulty communicating the deviation: for a girl to
switch sororities, it is extremely useful for her to have a connection, a friend say, in the sorority. In
more anonymous settings, like online marketplaces or online dating platforms, agents may not even
be aware of each others’ existence. Rather than having agents rank each other explicitly (which
requires agents to know one-another), these markets employ centralized mechanisms which infers
agents’ preferences through various means (questionnaires, cookies on users’ machines, etc.). The
mechanism then selects a matching based on these preferences. Now whether this matching is stable
depends on whether the potential blocking pairs are aware of each other’s existence.
Similar stories can be told for decentralized matching markets. In decentralized labor markets,
for example, it is well-known that workers find out about new jobs more through personal contacts
than any other means (see, for example, the seminal study of Granovetter, [7]). Taken to the
extreme, this suggests that, in a fixed matching, the only feasible blocking agents for a given firm
are the friends of the workers employed by that firm. Motivated by this observation, Arcaute and
Vassilvitskii [3] study what they call locally stable matchings, or matchings stable with respect
to this feasibility constraint on blocking pairs. Their work and followup work showed that locally
stable matchings exist and certain random dynamics converge to these matchings in polynomial time
with only limited memory [8]. Furthermore, they observed that, unlike stable matchings, locally
stable matchings can have different sizes. A natural design goal is to maximize the number of
matched agents. Accordingly, followup work [5] proved that stable matchings are 32 -approximations
to maximum-cardinality locally stable matchings for a very restrictive special case in which workers
that are “popular” (matched in every stable matching) have no friends that are “unpopular” (single
in some stable matching) that are also interested in some of the same firms. They also conjectured
that there is a 32 -approximation for the general case. Other work [9] proved
3
2 is the best-possible
approximation factor assuming the unique games conjecture.
In this paper, we focus on centralized matching markets and restrict feasible blocking pairs to
be a subset of all pairs. This subset is represented by a bipartite graph called the social graph and is
meant to capture agents with mutual knowledge of each other and direct channels of communication.
For example, a given girl will be connected to all sororities in which she has friends; a given buyer
will be connected to all sellers with whom he has conducted prior business transactions; a man
in an online dating platform will be connected with all the women he knows socially outside of
the platform. We note that, especially for online platforms, this social graph is something the
mechanism itself can infer: agents that are in touch with each other are those that have messaged
each other on the site or engaged in prior transactions. Our goal is to compute a matching with
no blocking pairs that form an edge in the social graph. We call such a matching a socially stable
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matching. Clearly any stable matching is also socially stable. However the converse is not true.
Furthermore, as is the case for locally stable matchings, not all socially stable matchings have the
same size. Thus we focus on computing maximum socially stable matchings. In this paper, we
provide a centralized algorithm that computes a socially-stable matching which is at 23 the size
of the maximum socially-stable matching, yielding a 32 -approximation. We also show our problem
is NP-hard and hard to approximate to within 32 − ǫ assuming the widely-believed unique games
conjecture.
Socially stable matchings are clearly related to the locally stable matchings studied in prior
work [3, 5, 8, 9], but there are some subtle and important differences. From a modeling perspective,
locally stable matchings ask us to believe that friends communicate opportunities to each other
although they are direct competitors. In particular, why should an agent inform his friends of his
match if his friend might form a blocking pair with his match and leave him single? In socially
stable matchings, the incentives of the communicating agents (pairs in the social graph) are aligned.
This modeling change also causes a key technical difference: social stability is fundamentally a static
notion. The feasible blocking pairs are defined with respect to the input and not with respect to
the proposed matching as is the case for locally stable matchings. Due to this technical difference,
neither model can be reduced to the other. Furthermore, the static properties of our model enable
us to suggest an intuitive algorithmic technique: prioritize matches that appear as edges in the
social graph. It is this intuition that allows us to get a tight approximation result in our model
despite the illusiveness of a similar result in the local stability model.
2 Preliminaries
The agents of a standard matching market are partitioned into two sets: a set of men M and a set
of women W . Each man m ∈M has a strict preference order ≻m over W ∪ {m}, and each woman
w ∈ W has a strict preference order ≻w over M ∪ {w}. We say that an agent a prefers b to b
′ if
b ≻a b
′, and that a prefers being unmatched to being matched with b if a ≻a b. The set of agents
{b : a ≻a b} are said to be unacceptable to a; the remaining agents {b : b ≻a a} are said to be
acceptable.
In addition to this standard input, we augment the model to take into account social ties between
the men and women. We respresent these social ties by a bipartite graph G = (M ∪W,E) which we
call the social graph. We say (m,w) are friends if (m,w) is an edge in G, and interpret this to mean
that agents m and w have a direct channel of communication. Note that there is no correlation
between the social graph and the preferences: even if (m,w) is not an edge in G, it can be that m
and/or w prefer each other to being single and/or to being matched to other candidates.
A matching µ is a function mappingM∪W to itself such that µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m.
If for some agent a, µ(a) = a, then we say that agent a is single in matching µ. The cardinality
of a matching is the number of matched (i.e., not-single) agents. When convenient, we sometimes
indicate a matching by listing the matched pairs; the unlisted agents are understood to be single.
A matching µ is individually rational if, for all agents a such that µ(a) 6= a, µ(a) ≻a a, i.e., a
prefers his or her assigned match to being single. A pair (m,w) are a blocking pair for a matching µ
if w ≻m µ(m) and m ≻w µ(w), i.e., if they both strictly prefer each other to their assigned matches.
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and has no blocking pairs.
It is known that stable matchings always exist; all stable matchings have the same cardinality;
and that the stable matchings form a lattice structure. In particular, there is a single stable
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matching µM , called the man-optimal stable matching, that is preferred by all men to all other
stable matchings µ, i.e., ∀m ∈ M , either µM (m) = µ(m) or µM(m) ≻m µ(m). Furthermore, this
matching can be computed efficiently using the man-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm [6].
This algorithm proceeds as follows: the tentative matching µ is initialized to be the empty matching,
i.e., for all agents a, µ(a) = a. In each round, a single man proposes to his most-preferred woman
who has not yet rejected him. When a woman w receives a proposal from a man m′, she tentatively
accepts if she prefers m′ to her current match µ(w) and rejects her current match, if any. A more
complete description of this algorithm can be found in [6]. We use two key properties of this
algorithm: 1) a woman is single at the end of the process if and only if she received no proposals,
and 2) a man is single at the end of the process if and only if he has proposed to every acceptable
woman on his preference list.
We are particularly interested in matchings which are stable with respect to the social ties. We
say a pair (m,w) are a social blocking pair for a matching µ if (m,w) are a blocking pair for µ and
(m,w) is an edge in the social graph G. Similar to stable matchings, we define a matching µ to be
socially stable if it is individually rational and has no social blocking pairs.
This definition captures the idea that a blocking pair only constitutes a threat to the stability of
a matching if the two agents have direct communication and are able to coordinate a deviation. It’s
straightforward to see that if G is the empty graph then no pair can be socially-blocking and hence
all matchings are socially stable. In contrast, if G is the complete bipartite graph then the notion
of social stability coincides with the traditional notion of stability. In general, the set of socially
stable matchings is a superset of the set of stable matchings.
In contrast with the case of stable matchings, not all socially-stable matchings have the same size.
For example, given an empty graph, any matching is socially stable. Hence, a natural optimization
problem arises: Given a set of preferences {≻m| m ∈ M} and {≻w| w ∈ W}, and a social graph
G = (M∪W,E), find a maximum-cardinality socially stable matching. We call this the Soc-Stable
problem. As we will see, this problem is NP-hard, and so we develop approximation algorithms for
it. An algorithm A is an α-approximation for the Soc-Stable problem if, on every instance, it
outputs a matching µA whose cardinality |µA| is at least
1
α
|µˆ| for the maximum socially stable
matching µˆ.
Example Consider an instance I = (P,G = (M ∪ W,E)) with two men, m1 and m2, and
two women, w1 and w2 with preferences as shown in Figure 1. Let G be such that E(G) =
m1 w1
m2 w2
≻m1 : w2, w1,m1
≻m2 : w2, w1,m2
≻w1 : m1, w1
≻w2 : m1,m2, w2
Figure 1: Example of an instance for Soc-Stable
{(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}. Then the only stable matching µ for this instance is µ = {(m1, w2)}. As
µ is stable, it is also socially stable, and so there is a socially stable matching of cardinality one.
However, there is a second larger socially stable matching µˆ of cardinality two which matches
µˆ = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}. Indeed m1 and w2 prefer each other to their assigned matches under µˆ
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and so µˆ is not stable, but since (m1, w2) 6∈ E(G) they are not a social blocking pair and so µˆ is
socially stable.
3 Approximation Results
As shown in Section 4, the Soc-Stable problem is NP-hard and 32 -inapproximable assuming the
widely-believed unique games conjecture. Furthermore, there is a trivial 2-approximation for the
problem: simply compute a stable matching and return that. Since a stable matching must be
maximal with respect to the restrictions imposed by individual rationality, it is a 2-approximation
to the maximum individually rational matching which, in turn, is an upper-bound on the cardinality
of the maximum socially stable matching.
In this section, we develop a polynomial time algorithm that is a 32 -approximation. The main
idea behind the algorithm is to alter each woman’s preference and give low priority to all the men
that she is not connected with in the social graph, no matter their position in her preference list.
We then use an idea introduced by Király [11]: we first compute the man-optimal stable matching.
We then give a second chance to men that are single in this matching by promoting them in the
women’s preferences and allowing them to re-initiate their proposal process.
To formally define the algorithm, consider an instance of the Soc-Stable problem with men
M , women W , preferences {≻m |m ∈ M} and {≻w |w ∈ W}, and social graph G = (M ∪W,E).
For each woman w ∈ W , we let Tw denote the set of men that woman w has promoted to the top
of her preference list. Throughout the algorithm, we maintain the invariant that Tw is a prefix of
w’s preference list. We initiate Tw = {m : (m,w) ∈ E(G)} and create a corresponding preference
list ≻′w by promoting all men in Tw to the top of w’s preference, preserving the relative order.
More formally, for all acceptable men m and m′, we define m ≻′w m
′ if and only if one of the
following three conditions holds: 1) m ≻w m
′ and (m,w) ∈ E(G) and (m′, w) ∈ E(G), 2) m ≻w m
′
and (m,w) 6∈ E(G) and (m′, w) 6∈ E(G), or 3) (m,w) ∈ E(G) and (m′, w) 6∈ E(G) (the set of
unacceptable men and their relative ordering remains unchanged). Note that, due to the third
condition, it might be the case that m ≻′w m
′ while m′ ≻w m.
Our algorithm first computes a man-optimal stable matching µM for a market with preferences
{≻m} for the men and {≻
′
w} for the women. We initialize our tentative socially stable matching
µ to be this man-optimal stable matching µM . We then give every single man a second chance.
To this end, we introduce a variable sm ∈ {0, 1} that tracks whether a man has received a second
chance and initialize sm := 0 for all m. We repeatedly select a currently single man m
∗ with
sm∗ := 0, set sm∗ := 1 and Tw := Tw ∪ {m
∗} for all women w, and promote m∗ in the women’s
preferences by redefining ≻′w to be m ≻
′
w m
∗ if and only if m ≻w m
∗ and m ∈ Tw (the preference
order ≻′w is unchanged on all other comparisons). We then set the tentative matching µ to be the
new man-optimal stable matching with respect to these altered preferences. When the algorithm
terminates, we return µ as the socially stable matching. A pseudo-code description of the algorithm
appears above.
Note that this algorithm terminates in polynomial time as we run the polynomial-time man-
proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm at most |M | + 1 times. We would like to prove two ad-
ditional properties of this algorithm. First, we show that it computes a socially stable matching.
Second, we show the socially stable matching is a 32 -approximation to the maximum socially stable
matching.
Theorem 3.1 Algorithm socGS computes a socially stable matching.
5
ALGORITHM 1: socGS
1. ∀ w ∈W , set Tw = {m : (m,w) ∈ E(G)}.
2. ∀ w ∈W and ∀ m,m′ ∈M : m ≻w w ∧m
′ ≻w w define m ≻
′
w m
′ if and only if
a. m ≻w m
′ and (m,w) ∈ E(G) and (m′, w) ∈ E(G),
b. m ≻w m
′ and (m,w) 6∈ E(G) and (m′, w) 6∈ E(G),
c. or (m,w) ∈ E(G) and (m′, w) 6∈ E(G).
For all remaining pairs, let ≻′=≻.
3. For every man m, set sm = 0.
4. Let µ be the outcome of the man-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
while ∃ m∗ : µ(m∗) = m∗ ∧ sm∗ = 0 do
1. Set sm∗ := 1 and, ∀ w ∈W , set Tw := Tw ∪ {m
∗}.
2. ∀ w ∈W and ∀ m ∈ Tw set m
∗ ≻′w m if and only if m
∗ ≻w m.
3. ∀ w ∈W and ∀ m 6∈ Tw set m
∗ ≻′w m.
4. Let µ be the outcome of the man-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
Proof: Let µ be the matching output by the algorithm and note that, by the properties of the
deferred-acceptance algorithm, µ is stable with respect to the men’s preferences ≻m and the women’s
final altered preferences ≻′w. Suppose that µ is not socially stable with respect to the true preferences
{≻m,≻w} and let (m,w) be a socially blocking pair. Then w ≻m µ(m), m ≻w µ(w), and (m,w) ∈
E(G).
We consider two cases based on whether (µ(w), w) ∈ E(G). First suppose (µ(w), w) ∈ E(G).
Then at any point in the algorithm, ≻w and ≻
′
w agree on the ordering of m and µ(w). Thus
w ≻m µ(m) and m ≻
′
w µ(w), contradicting the stability of µ.
Next suppose (µ(w), w) 6∈ E(G). Then the algorithm initializes m ≻′w µ(w). The algorithm may
later promote µ(w), but only to his position in the original preferences, and so even after promotion
m ≻′w µ(w). This again contradicts the stability of µ.
We next argue that the algorithm is a 32 -approximation. The proof follows a standard technique
also used by Iwama et al. [10] in the context of stable matchings: to prove a matching µ is a
3
2 -approximation to a matching µˆ, consider the multi-graph induced by the union µ ∪ µˆ and note
that every component consists of cycles or alternating paths, i.e. paths whose edges belong to µ
and µˆ alternately. To prove that |µ| ≥ 23 µˆ, it is enough to show that there is no alternating path of
size three that starts and ends with an edge of µˆ (as in all other possible components the inequality
holds).
Theorem 3.2 Let µ be the outcome of Algorithm socGS and µˆ be the maximum socially stable
matching. Then |µ| ≥ 23 |µˆ|.
Proof: Suppose that there exists an alternating path (w∗,m,w,m∗) in the multi-graph induced by
the union µ ∪ µˆ such that (m,w∗) ∈ µˆ, (m,w) ∈ µ, and (m∗, w) ∈ µˆ. We will contradict the social
stability of µˆ.
Note both w∗ and m∗ are single in µ. Since w∗ is single at the end of the algorithm, we show
that she never received an offer in any iteration of the man-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm.
We argue that every woman’s match can only improve in subsequent iterations. This is because
the outcome of man-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, without including the man that was
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given as second chance at this iteration, will be exactly the outcome of the previous iteration since
he ended up single. Therefore, since it is known that the order of proposals does not matter, we can
assume that we first produce the matching of the previous iteration by letting these men propose
and then we allow the man that was given a second chance to start proposing. It is known also that
the women are weakly improved at any step of the man-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm,
which implies that they are at least as happy as the previous iteration. Hence, w∗ was single at
every iteration which only possible if she received no offer in any iteration. This implies that m
never proposed to w∗ even though she was acceptable to him and he to her (by the individual
rationality of µˆ. This means that
m was never single, (1)
and
w ≻m w
∗. (2)
Furthermore, since m∗ is single at the end of the algorithm, at some point m∗ was given a second
chance (i.e., selected as the single man in the while-loop of the algorithm). At this point, he was
promoted in woman w’s list, proposed to her, and was still rejected during that iteration of the
man-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm. As women’s tentative matches only improve in this
algorithm, this means that m ≻′w m
∗. Thus since m∗ was added to Tw in this iteration and Tw is a
prefix of w’s list,
m ∈ Tw, (3)
and
m ≻w m
∗. (4)
Finally, we observe that, since m was never single and hence never chosen in the while-loop of
the algorithm, and yet m ∈ Tw, it must be that m was added to Tw in the initialization proving
(m,w) ∈ E(G). We also argued that w ≻m w
∗ and m ≻w m
∗, and so (m,w) is a social blocking
pair for µˆ, contradicting the social stability of µˆ.
Example The example below shows that this upper bound of the performance of Algorithm socGS
is tight.
m1 w1
m2 w2
m3 w3
≻m1 : w1, w2,m1
≻m2 : w1, w3, w2,m2
≻m3 : w3,m3
≻w1 : m2,m1, w1
≻w2 : m1, w2
≻w3 : m2,m3, w3
Algorithm socGS will initiate preferences of the women as follows:
≻′w1 : m1,m2, w1, ≻
′
w2
: m1, w1, and ≻
′
w3
: m2,m3, w1
Then m1 will propose to w1 and they will be matched. m2 will propose to w1 and will be rejected
since m1 ≻
′
w1
m2, so m2 will propose to w3 and they will be matched. After that, m3 will propose
7
to w3, will be rejected and hence remain single at the end of the first run of the men-proposing Gale-
Shapley algorithm. So algorithm socGS will promote him in the lists of all women that find him
acceptable, set s(m3) = 1 and reactivate him. m3 will propose to w3 but she will reject him again
since she prefers m2 even in the new preferences. So the matching that socGS will return will be
µ = {(m1, w1), (m2, w3)} which has size two. It’s easy to see that µˆ = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3)}
is the maximum socially stable matching and has size 3.
4 NP-Hardness and Hardness of Approximation
Having already shown that a 32 -approximation ratio is possible within polynomial time, we prove here
a matching lower bound. We show that assuming the unique games conjecture, the Soc-Stable
problem cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a ratio of 32 − ǫ, for any constant ǫ.
We do that by showing a reduction from the notoriously NP-hard problem of Independent Set. The
reduction will give us as an obvious consequence that Soc-Stable is NP-hard.
The Independent Set problem takes as an instance a pair (G, k) of a graph and an integer k ≥ 0
and asks if the graph G contains a set S ⊆ V (G) such that |S| = k and for every v1, v2 ∈ S, (v1, v2) /∈
E(G), i.e. no two nodes of S are connected with an edge. It was one of the first problems that was
proven to be NP-hard.
Our reduction follows very closely the reduction that Hoefer and Wagner [9] from Independent
Set to the problem of calculating the maximum locally stable matching. Although the basic idea of
the construction is the same, we need to adjust the details as well as the proofs to our problem.
Given a graph G = (V,E) we create an instance I = ({≻m}, {≻w}, G
′ = (M ∪W,E)) of the
Soc-Stable matching problem as follows: First we enumerate (arbitrarily but consistently) all the
nodes of G : v1, v2, . . . , vn, where n = |V (G)|. For every vi ∈ V (G) we create four vertices of G′:
mvi
1
,mvi
2
∈M and wvi
1
, wvi
2
∈W . For every vi ∈ V (G) we denote byNG(v
i) = {vj | (vi, vj) ∈ E(G)}
the neighborhood of vi in G, i.e. the nodes that vi is connected with in G. Similarly, for a set
S ⊂ V (G) we denote by NG(S) =
⋃
vi∈S NG(v
i) the union of the neighborhoods of the nodes in S.
mv1
1
wv1
1
mv1
2
wv1
2
mv2
1
wv2
1
mv2
2
wv2
2
Figure 2: Reduction from Independent Set: The gadget of some edge (v1, v2)
For every vi ∈ V (G) and every vj ∈ NG(v
i) we add the edge {mvi
1
, w
v
j
2
} to E(G′). See Figure 2
for an example of the transformation for an edge (v1, v2). The preferences of the agents are as follows:
≻m
vi
1
: wvi
2
, {w
v
j
2
in increasing order on j | vj ∈ NG(v
i)}, wvi
1
,mvi
1
≻w
vi
2
: mvi
1
, {m
v
j
1
in increasing order on j | vj ∈ NG(v
i)},mvi
2
, wvi
2
≻m
vi
2
: wvi
2
,mvi
2
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≻w
vi
1
: mvi
1
, wvi
1
Notice that the enumeration of the vertices of V (G) that we did in the beginning of our reduction
shows up here, in the preferences of mvi
1
and wvi
2
. We prove the following two lemmas for the above
construction.
Lemma 4.1 If G has an independent set S of size r then I has a socially stable matching µ of size
n+ r.
Proof: We take µ = {(mvi
1
, wvi
2
) | vi ∈ V (G) \ S} ∪ {(mvi
1
, wvi
1
), (mvi
2
, wvi
2
) | vi ∈ S}. We obviously
have that |µ| = n − |S| + 2 · |S| = n + r. The pairs (mvi
1
, wvi
2
) are always socially stable. For the
rest of the pairs, the independent set property guarantees that for every vj ∈ NG(S), the matching
of (m
v
j
1
, w
v
j
2
) keeps (mvi
1
, wvi
1
) and (mvi
2
, wvi
2
) socially stable.
The reverse direction is a little more technical.
Lemma 4.2 If I has a socially stable matching of size n+ r then G has an independent set of size
r.
Proof: First of all we can assume that µ is such that all mvi
1
are matched. If there is an mvi
1
that
is not matched we can just take wvi
2
and match her to him. If some other m
v
j
1
gets single by this
action we just do it repeatedly until no such mvi
1
exists. This will not break social stability of the
matching nor decrease the size.
Claim 1 If there exists i 6= j such that (mvi
1
, w
v
j
2
) ∈ µ, then (m
v
j
1
, wvi
2
) ∈ µ as well.
Proof: Notice first, that by our construction and the fact that (mvi
1
, w
v
j
2
) ∈ µ we get that vj ∈
NG(v
i). And hence (m
v
j
1
, wvi
2
) ∈ E(G′). Suppose now that the statement is not true and take the
minimum i such that (mvi
1
, w
v
j
2
) ∈ µ for some j 6= i. We first have that i < j. For suppose that
j < i, then if m
v
j
1
is matched to some wvk
2
, for some k 6= j, that contradicts the minimal choice of i.
Hence it must be that m
v
j
1
is matched to w
v
j
1
. Since (m
v
j
1
, wvi
2
) ∈ E(G′), and m
v
j
1
prefers wvi
2
over
w
v
j
1
, in order for µ to be socially stable it must be that wvi
2
is matched to someone that she prefers
to m
v
j
1
and that can only be some mvk
1
for some k < j < i, which contradicts the minimal choice of
i. So indeed, it must be that i < j.
Since (m
v
j
1
, wvi
2
) /∈ µ and they are connected with an edge in G′, in order for µ to be socially stable
it needs to be that at least one of m
v
j
1
and wvi
2
gets a match under µ that he/she prefers to the
other.
Suppose that wvi
2
is matched to some mvk
1
for some k < j (these are the only men that wvi
2
prefers from m
v
j
1
, since her top choice, mvi
1
, is matched with someone else). Then mvi
1
prefers wvk
2
to w
v
j
2
(since k < j) and wvk
2
prefers mvi
1
to her current match unless her current match is a mvm
1
for some m 6= k and m < i. But that would contradict the minimal selection of i. So it can’t be
the case that wvi
2
is matched under µ to someone she prefers to m
v
j
1
.
Suppose now that m
v
j
1
is matched to some wvk
2
for some k < i. That would mean that mvk
1
is not matched to wvk
2
and if he is matched to some wvm
2
for some m 6= k, that would contradict
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the minimal choice of i. Hence mvk
1
must be matched to wvk
1
. Since m
v
j
1
is matched to wvk
2
and
k 6= j, by the way we constructed the preferences, that means that (vj , vk) ∈ E(G) and hence
(mvk
1
, w
v
j
2
) ∈ E(G′). But that contradicts the social stability of µ because w
v
j
2
prefers mvk
1
to mvi
2
(since k < i), mvk
1
prefers w
v
j
2
to wvk
1
(since wvk
1
is his last choice). Hence, it can’t be the case that
m
v
j
1
is matched under µ to someone he prefers to wvi
2
.
So it needs to be that (m
v
j
1
, wvi
2
) ∈ µ
We can now take all dyads of pairs of the form {(mvi
1
, w
v
j
2
), (m
v
j
1
, wvi
2
)} for i 6= j that belong
to µ and replace them with {(mvi
1
, wvi
2
), (m
v
j
1
, w
v
j
2
)}. This will not break social stability of µ nor
decrease it’s size. We take now S = {vi | mvi
2
∈ µ}. Since all n of mvi
1
are matched in µ there are k
couples that contain some mvi
2
and hence |S| = |µ| − n = k. S is an independent set because mvi
2
can only be matched to wvi
2
and hence mvi
1
is matched to wvi
1
. The latter pairs are only stable if
for every vj ∈ NG(v
i) it holds that m
v
j
1
is matched to w
v
j
2
and hence m
v
j
2
/∈ µ which means that
vj /∈ S and hence S is indeed an Independent Set.
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 combined give us the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 The Soc-Stable problem is NP-hard.
Austrin et al. in [4] show that assuming the unique games conjecture Independent Set is hard
to approximate within a factor of O
(
d
log2 d
)
for Independent sets of size k =
(
1
2 −Θ
(
log(log d)
log d
))
n,
where n is the size of the vertex set and d is an upper bound on the degree. Combing that result
and Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 we get the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4 Under the Unique Game Conjecture the Soc-Stable problem cannot be approxi-
mated within a 32 − ǫ, for any constant ǫ.
Proof: The proof follows from the relationship between Soc-Stable and Independent Sets shown
by Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 and the result from [4]. It’s exactly the same as the proof of Corollary 4 of
[9]. We set d = δn for some constant δ > 0 and we get that finding the maximum socially stable
matching is hard to approximate within a factor of
n+
(
1
2 −Θ
(
log(logn)
logn
))
n
n+
(
1
2 −Θ
(
log(logn)
logn
))
n ·O
(
logn
n
) ≥ 3
2
− ǫ (5)
for sufficiently large n.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we introduced a generalized model of stable matchings by augmenting the input of a
standard matching problem with a graph G, which represents the communication between agents in
the two sides of the market. Driven by the intuition the only agents that have some kind of direct
communication with each other can coordinate a possible deviation, we defined the notion of social
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blocking pair to be a blocking pair that is also connected with an edge in G. That gave us an extra
degree of flexibility when trying to find maximum socially stable matching, i.e. matchings that don’t
have any social blocking pairs, because now, in contrast to the classical stable matching problem,
only a subset of the agents can be potentially blocking. We defined the problem Soc-Stable to
be the problem of finding a maximum size socially stable matching and showed that, assuming
the unique games conjecture, this problem is hard to approximate within a ratio of 32 − ǫ, for any
constant ǫ. Finally, we accompanied the hardness result with a matching lower bound by showing
a 32 -approximation algorithm
A lot of interesting future directions arise from this work. First of all it would be interesting
to see special cases of the social graph G and/or the preferences of the agents for which the Soc-
Stable problem is polynomial-time solvable. We believe that when the graph is a tree as well
as when there is a master preference list in at least one side of the market, the problem becomes
polynomial-time solvable.
One could also look at different optimization problems, other than finding the maximum socially
stable matching. For example, if we are allowed to “block” at most a certain number of edges of G,
i.e. remove them from the graph, which edges should we remove in order to obtain as large socially
stable matchings as possible?
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